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Key Ideas and Policy Recommendations 
It is generally agreed that a Banking Union should have common or ‘single’ 
institutions responsible for carrying out three basic functions: supervision, 
resolution and deposit insurance.  So far, however, agreement has been reached 
in the EU on only the first two functions.  
The Commission has now presented its proposal on how to complete the 
Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS).1 It is an 
innovative and courageous proposal. It is courageous because it will clearly be 
very controversial in a number of member states (especially Germany) and it is 
innovative because it proposes a three-stage process, starting with re-insurance, 
then switching to co-insurance and finally to full direct insurance of deposits via 
a ‘single’ Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). This final stage should be reached in 
2024, which is also the date at which the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) will 
become the only source of financing for bank resolution. The Commission’s 
proposal calls for integrating the decision-making for EDIS into the decision-
making entity for the SRF, namely the existing Single Resolution Board (SRB). 
This makes sense if one views resolution and deposit insurance as two highly 
interlinked dimensions of dealing with banks in trouble. In this view the two 
dimensions should be bundled into one institution – and one suspects that over 
time the two funds (the SRF and the DIF) could be merged into one. 
This Policy Brief argues that re-insurance should not be considered as a 
transitory phase, but could also provide a solution for the long run. ‘Experience 
rating’ could be used to ensure a proper pricing of risk and to protect the 
interests of the depositors in countries with safer banking systems. Moreover, 
EDIS should have a decision-making structure separate from and independent 
of the SRM, since it has mainly a macroeconomic function. 
                                                   
1 See the Commission’s proposal published 24 November 2015, at: http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/docs/banking-
union/european-deposit-insurance-scheme/151124-proposal_en.pdf 




It can be argued that deposit insurers should 
normally also be responsible for resolution and 
that the two functions should be combined into 
one institution (and have the same source of 
funding), as is the case in the US with the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (Gros & 
Schoenmaker, 2012). The basic rationale for this 
‘unitary’ view is simple: when deciding whether 
or not to finance the resolution of a failing bank, 
the resolution authority should take into account 
the potential cost for the deposit insurer that 
might arise if the bank is allowed to fail. This can 
be achieved best if the two functions are housed 
under the same roof. 
In reality, however, resolution and deposit 
insurance are of quite a different nature; and the 
rationale for fully centralising deposit insurance 
is much weaker than for resolution. The purpose 
of bank resolution is to avoid an insolvency with 
all the costs and contagion effects it might 
generate. Resolution thus aims to ensure 
continuity of those main functions of a bank that 
are deemed to be of systemic importance. Public 
funding is needed only to the extent that no 
private-sector solution can be organised on short 
notice. The purpose of a resolution fund is to 
finance investment in a new bank (to be carved 
out of the failing one) – not to give money away. 
A well-run resolution fund should thus be 
profitable. By contrast, a deposit insurance fund 
can only make losses, as it is used when a bank 
has failed and the losses are so large that 
depositors cannot get their money back. In short, 
a resolution fund invests in the future, whereas a 
deposit insurance fund pays for losses from the 
past. 
Moreover, resolution is decided on a case-by-case 
basis, necessarily involving a considerable dose 
of discretion, as there can always be legitimate 
disagreement over the systemic importance of a 
bank and the financing needed to create a new 
one that could take over its essential functions. 
Deposit insurance, by contrast, applies to all 
banks in the same way and leaves no discretion: 
the pay-out is pre-determined (up to €100,000 per 
person) and has to be done within a few days. 
Reserving discretion on which banks to resolve 
(and how to finance their resolution) at the 
national level would have endangered the level 
playing field of the internal market. And this is 
why a single resolution mechanism was needed. 
But this argument does not apply to deposit 
insurance where there is little room for such 
discretion. 
Large banks active in several member states 
would represent a problem for any national 
resolution fund, but much less for national 
deposit insurance funds since any one of them 
would only have to pay out to make good on the 
losses suffered by resident depositors (provided 
the retail operations are organised via 
subsidiaries, rather than via branches). By 
contrast, resolution funding is needed for the 
entire group. This is another reason why a single 
resolution fund is needed for large, 
internationally active banks, but not necessarily a 
single deposit insurance fund. 
Moreover, the direct benefits of insuring 
depositors are quite local as cross-border retail 
deposits remain a rarity. It thus makes sense to 
keep the cost local as well. All this implies that 
the argument for centralising deposit insurance 
is much weaker than for bank resolution. 
The one public function that national deposit 
insurance funds are not well equipped to 
perform is that of maintaining the confidence of 
depositors when the entire banking system of a 
country is under stress. In a systemic banking 
crisis (systemic at the national level), the 
accumulated funds in the national deposit 
insurance scheme are likely to be insufficient But 
the government of the country in question is 
likely to be under pressure as well, which implies 
that the national fiscal backstop is likely to be 
weak when it is needed most.    
A national systemic crisis is actually much less 
likely to arise in future since the SRM will 
probably intervene if the failure of a bank (or a 
number of them) threatens to trigger a systemic 
crisis, especially given that most large banks are 
also internationally active. The SRM is actually 
directly responsible for only the 120-plus banks 
under direct ECB (or rather SSM) supervision, 
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and banks with significant cross-border business.  
There are thus ‘only’ about 140 banks that would 
come under the direct competence of the Single 
Resolution Board (SRB). This group of banks 
accounts for the bulk of banking activity in the 
euro area (about 80%, whether measured by 
assets or deposits). This implies that the SRM de 
facto represents a first line of defence against 
systemic crisis. But there remains a significant 
part of the banking system that is not covered by 
the SRM.  
The main activity of national deposit (or 
guarantee) systems (DGSs) might thus become 
monitoring hundreds of smaller banks with little 
international business. There might of course be 
more failures among these ‘national’ banks since 
the SRM is much less likely (than national 
authorities) to intervene to resolve medium-sized 
banks that might be important at the national 
level, but would not represent a threat to 
systemic stability at the euro-area level. 
It cannot be ruled out, however, that the SRM will 
not intervene in a crisis that is systemic at the 
national level, but does not endanger euro-area 
stability. In this (unlikely) case, the national DGS 
might be overwhelmed and its sovereign might 
not be able to provide a sufficient backstop. This 
is why some mechanism is needed to insure 
against this risk of a systemic shock. The 
appropriate mechanism to achieve this is re-
insurance: i.e. to provide national DGSs with an 
insurance against large shocks. Gros (2013) 
provides a detailed proposal along these lines 
(see also the next section).  
The purpose of deposit insurance – or Deposit 
Guarantee Systems (DGSs), as they are called in 
EU legislation – is to prevent a run on deposits 
Such a run can arise for any single bank if the 
protection is not perceived as absolute, as shown 
in the case of Northern Rock in the UK But this 
problem has been taken care of by the new, more 
stringent rules for protection and payout periods. 
A nation-wide deposit run, however, is unlikely 
to occur in the ‘standard’ setting of a country 
with its own national currency since it would 
require all depositors to switch out of deposits 
into cash. Within the euro area, however, the 
probability of a generalised bank run within any 
one member state is much greater, since 
depositors could just transfer their accounts 
abroad and continue to transact their banking in 
the same currency. This is why it is important to 
give savers the confidence that their deposits will 
be protected even if the entire nation is under 
stress.  
2. The re-insurance approach: 
A schematic presentation 
Under the pure re-insurance approach, national 
DGSs would continue to function as before, but 
each one would be forced to take out insurance 
coverage against large shocks. This (re-
)insurance could be managed under the EDIS, as 
foreseen for the first three years under the 
Commission’s proposal. The funding for the re-
insurance could come from the DIF, which the 
Commission wants to set up. 
The funding for the DIF in turn would come from 
the national DGSs, which would have to transmit 
part of the fees they are levying on individual 
banks to the European level (the DIF). 
Schematically there would thus be two tiers of 
deposit insurance: by the national DGSs in 
relationship to ‘their’ banks and by the European 
re-insurer in relationship to the national DGSs. 
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This two-tier system would react differently to 
the failure of a small bank than to a systemic 
problem at the national level. This is illustrated in 
Figures 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 2. The case of a single bank failure 
 
 
Figure 3. Systemic crisis at the national level 
The European re-insurer (i.e. EDIS with its fund, 
the DIF) would thus intervene only in the event 
that so many banks fail in any given country 
that the national DGS would be overwhelmed. 
It is often argued that the re-insurance concept 
cannot take care of the ‘fiscal backstop’ problem. 
It is clear that the resources of any normal deposit 
insurance will always be insufficient in the event 
of a systemic crisis. This also applies for the euro 
area as whole. If there is a systemic crisis at the 
euro-area level (as opposed to a national crisis), 
any European insurance scheme would need a 
fiscal backstop. This applies to the re-insurance 
approach as well as the case in which there 
would be one single European deposit insurer. 
Figure 4 depicts schematically the case of a euro 
area-wide crisis, assuming that the ESM would 
constitute the fiscal backstop. 
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Figure 4. The case of a euro area-wide systemic crisis and the need for a fiscal backstop 
 
3. Pricing risk: Micro vs macro 
One key aspect of the reinsurance approach is 
that it is a macroeconomic function. Its main 
concern will not be the risk parameters of each 
individual bank in the each country, but rather 
the systemic risk that arises from developments 
at the macroeconomic level (e.g. rising house 
prices, increasing leverage in the corporate 
sector, etc.). In principle, this expertise is already 
available in the ESRB. It would thus be important 
to find an institutional solution in which this 
expertise can be used. Moreover, procedures to 
prevent systemic problems already exist, such as 
the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) 
and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The 
macroeconomic aspect will remain a 
predominantly national responsibility for a long 
time, driven by national fiscal policy, wage 
developments, the fiscal treatment of housing, 
etc.  
Looking at the risk parameters of individual 
banks cannot capture these macroeconomic 
factors. During the boom years, for example, 
Spanish banks appeared to be among the 
strongest and most profitable in the EU. The 
normal risk metrics would have assigned them a 
very low risk level. By contrast, a macroeconomic 
approach, based for example on the indicators of 
the MIP, would have signalled a high level of 
risk. Increasing the price for re-insurance when 
the macroeconomic, or macro-prudential 
indicators signal higher risk would be 
appropriate, and possible under the re-insurance 
approach. This is another advantage of the re-
insurance approach: it allows one to gradually 
price macroeconomic risk. 
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Pricing macroeconomic risk will always remain 
imperfect. One could thus consider an element of 
‘experience rating’. This would imply that the 
DGS of a country that has experienced a large 
shock would be required to pay higher premia 
until a certain proportion of the funds it had 
drawn from the European re-insurer (say the DIF 
of EDIS) had been repaid.   
Experience rating is used in many areas of 
insurance: it implies that premia typically 
increase after an insured event has occurred. It 
seems normal to apply its principles also in the 
case of deposit insurance.2 Experience rating is 
used in the United States in the area of 
unemployment insurance to distribute the cost 
more fairly among individual enterprises. 
Enterprises that fire employees more often pay a 
higher premium. Experience rating thus 
represents an attempt to link risk premia to risk 
that has actually materialised. But experience 
rating is also used to equalise, ex post, across 
states. States that experienced very large pay-
outs to unemployed are later required to adjust 
their premia (or their coverage ratios) until they 
have repaid their debt to a Federal fund. In this 
case, experience rating is equivalent to a claw-
back provision. 
Something similar could be applied in the re-
insurance model as well. The higher rates that a 
national DGS would be subject to after it has 
received a pay-out from the DIF should of course 
apply only in the very long run, since the purpose 
of the re-insurance model is to provide funding 
in case of a (national) systemic crisis. Claw back 
should start only once the crisis is over. 
Moreover, there should be no presumption that 
experience rating leads to a full claw back of any 
pay-out via higher premium payments. But a 
partial claw back (i.e. a recovery of the pay-outs) 
seems appropriate, given that, in reality, a 
country-wide crisis can only rarely be attributed 
to errors of supervision (which has been 
centralised), but also only rarely can it be 
attributed to macroeconomic mismanagement at 
                                                   
2 Experience rating is used widely in health insurance 
as the occurrence of an insurable event usually 
indicates that the individual in question is of overall 
bad health and thus poses a higher likelihood of 
the national level. The reality of the EU, with its 
shared sovereignty in economic matters, implies 
that the cost of dealing with a systemic crisis of a 
single Member State should also be shared. 
Experience rating with individual banks is not 
possible since the depositors need a pay-out only 
after the bank in question is bankrupt. This is 
another advantage of the re-insurance approach. 
The one risk that cannot be properly priced and 
prevented is that of re-denomination, or rather 
exit from the euro. It is clear that no common 
deposit insurance could be asked to fully pay out 
€100,000 to each depositor in a country where the 
government has decided to re-introduce a 
national currency. The ‘Grexit’ problem cannot 
be solved either by fully centralised deposit 
insurance or via the re-insurance approach. The 
only solution one can imagine is that any country 
that leaves the euro will have to rely on its 
national DGS, which could claim from EDIS and 
the DIF only the amount of premia it had paid in 
previously. 
Conclusions 
The case for moving deposit insurance to the 
European (in reality euro-area) level seems 
simple and powerful: banking supervision is 
now performed at the European level. Any bank 
that fails represents an error made by a European 
institution, namely the European Central Bank, 
or to be more precise, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM). Hence it is appropriate that a 
European fund also pays for the consequences of 
any mistakes in supervision. 
However, this syllogism is less powerful than 
appears at first sight. 
First of all, the purpose of supervision is not to 
ensure that no bank ever fails. The purpose of the 
Banking Union is not to prevent all bank failures, 
but rather to provide a workable framework in 
which failure is possible. 
further costs for the insurer. From the perspective of 
the individual, this is perceived as unfair, but the logic 
could also apply to the likelihood of suffering a 
macroeconomic shock. 
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Secondly, in reality bank failures are not evenly 
distributed over member countries. They tend to 
be bunched together at times of macroeconomic 
stress. This implies that widespread or systemic 
banking crises tend to be national, which 
suggests that widespread bank failures usually 
also have a national, macroeconomic 
background. This fact of banking life can be 
managed with the re-insurance approach, but not 
when resolution and deposit insurance are both 
totally centralised at the European level.   
The Commission has already proposed to use the 
re-insurance approach, but only for a limited 
period. But there is no need to limit the re-
insurance period. It should be maintained at least 
until 2024, when the SRR and all the national 
DGSs should have reached their funding levels. 
It would be sufficient to have a review clause so 
that a decision whether or not to proceed to 
further integration could be taken at that point. 
This contribution has not addressed the issue of 
the large holdings of banks of the debt of their 
own government. It should be clear that any 
mutualisation of the protection of depositors 
makes sense only if the sovereign risk on bank 
balance sheets is also ‘mutualised’, or rather 
distributed. There is no need to restrict the 
holdings of sovereign debt by banks, but it would 
be necessary to impose strict diversification 
limits so that the insolvency of the sovereign does 
not immediately lead to the insolvency of all the 
banks of the country in question. 
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